Search models with wage posting and match-specific heterogeneity generate wage dispersion. Given K values for the match-specific variable, it is known that there are K reservation wages that could be posted, but generically never more than two actually are posted in equilibrium. What is unknown is when we get two wages, and which of the reservation wages are actually posted. For an example with K = 3, we show equilibrium is unique, may have one wage or two, and when there are two, the equilibrium can display any combination of posted reservation wages, depending on parameters. We also show how wages, profits and unemployment depend on productivity.
Introduction
Wage dispersion -a deviation from the law of one price in the labor marketis a subject of long-standing theoretical and empirical interest in economics. 1 In Gaumont, Schindler and Wright (2006) , hereafter GSW, we discuss several models of wage dispersion in search equilibrium with wage posting. Models based on ex ante homogeneous agents but ex post heterogeneous matches are shown to have advantages over earlier specifications based on ex ante heterogeneity (e.g. Albrecht and Axell, 1984, or Diamond, 1987) . In particular, they do not "unravel" with the introduction of small but positive search costs. However, although they do admit deviations from the law of one price, models with ex post heterogeneity are bound by the law of two prices (Curtis and Wright, 2004) .
To explain this, suppose there are K possible realizations of the matchspecific random variable. Then there are K distinct reservation wages, say w k , k = 1, ..., K, and no profit-maximizing firm would post anything but one of these w k . One can show that in a given equilibrium, generically, no more than two of them actually are posted. What is unknown is, when do we get two as opposed to a single wage; and when we get two, which reservation wages are posted -the two highest, the highest and the lowest, two consecutive wages, etc. Here we present an example with K = 3 and characterize the outcome. We show there is always a unique equilibrium, which will have one wage or two, depending on parameters. Then we show, when the equilibrium has two wages, again depending on parameters, these can be either w 1 and w 2 , w 2 and w 3 , or w 3 and w 1 .
This example is instructive because it helps us understand how and when wage dispersion happens, and exactly what kinds of wage dispersion can arise. It is appealing that we have a unique equilibrium, and the economic structure of this equilibrium is intuitively reasonable and simple. It does take a lot of work, however, to solve the example. The purpose of this note is to show how to do it.
The Model
There is a [0, 1] continuum of firms and a [0, L] continuum of workers. Time is continuous. All agents live forever, are risk neutral, and discount at rate r. Each firm has a constant returns technology with labor as the only input and productivity y. Firms with vacancies contact workers at rate γ, and unemployed workers contact firms at rate α; there is no on-the-job search. For our purposes, it makes sense to set L = 1, so that the arrival rates α and γ are effectively pinned down exogenously, helping to keep the analysis simple.
2 Matches end at exogenous rate δ. Firms post wages to maximize expected profit, given other firms' wages and worker behavior. Workers are ex ante homogeneous but matches are ex post heterogeneous. Thus, when a worker contacts a firm he draws at random c ∈ {c 1 , ..., c K }, where c is the per period cost to taking the job, with c 1 < c 2 < ... < c K < y, and the probability of c = c j is λ j > 0, P K j=1 λ j = 1. For example, c could be the cost of commuting. Generally there is also an opportunity cost b to taking a job, incorporating leisure, home production, etc. To reduce notation, normalize b = 0. Also, we assume that c is permanent for the duration of the match. Let W j (w) be the value to having a job with wage w and c = c j , and U the value of unemployed search. Clearly, conditional reservation wage strategies are optimal: given c = c j , accept a job iff w ≥ w j , where W j (w j ) = U. Notice w j+1 > w j . Hence there can be at most K wages posted since, as 2 This is because, with L = 1, the ratio of unemployed workers to vacancies is always 1. See GSW for details concerning the arrival rates, and how to solve for them in equilibrium, in generalized versions of the model. 3 Although the assumption of wage posting is standard in much of the literature on wage dispersion, there is an issue: it can lead to outcomes that are not renegotiation-proof, since some matches with positive surplus are not consummated. That is, when workers and firms meet they may have incentives to renegotiate, leading to wages that are not constant. We are not so ambitious to think we can solve every issue with wage-posting models in this paper, and so we do not dwell on this potential problem here, but we want to mention two ideas. First, if worker types are private information then of course the wage cannot depend on type -everyone could claim to be the type that implied the highest wage (although of course the very fact that a worker accepts or rejects may signal something). Second, it may not be in a firm's long run interest to renegotiate if for example the firm does not want to get a reputation for doing so. We leave serious attention to these issues to future research. 4 In GSW we also consider the case where employed workers draw a new c each period.
is completely standard, no firm would post anything other than one of the reservation wages: a firm posting w ∈ (w j , w j+1 ) could reduce w to w j and make more profit per worker without changing the set of workers who accept. Let θ j denote the fraction of firms posting w j , P K j=1 θ j = 1. A special case of this is the well-known result of Diamond (1971) that arises when K = 1: with homogeneous matches, all firms post w 1 = c 1 .
A problem with that model is that when there is any cost to search, no matter how small, the market will shut down since workers get no surplus from employment at w = c 1 . The same is true when there are ex ante heterogeneous workers, say K distinct types with different (but fixed) values of c. The highest c workers get no surplus from employment, so they drop out, and so on, and so the market "unravels" and shuts down. This is why we study models with ex post heterogeneity; in these models, as long as θ 1 < 1, workers get gains from search (e.g. he may get offer w > w 1 and draw c = c 1 ).
Bellman's equations for a worker are
In words, (1) says that he contacts firms at rate α, draws c = c j with probability λ j , and accepts if the posted wage is w i ≥ w j , which occurs with probability θ i . Given w is acceptable, (2) says that an employed worker gets w − c j until the match ends, which occurs at rate δ. Using W j (w j ) = U, we have
Expected profit for a firm posting a vacancy at w j is
where γ is the arrival rate of workers, ρ j = P j h=1 λ h is the probability a random worker accepts, and we use (3) to substitute for w j in terms of U. As we said, no firm posts anything other than one of the K reservation wages. Following Curtis and Wright (2004) , one can strengthen this to show that generically there are no more than two wages posted.
Proposition 1 For generic parameter values, we can have θ h > 0 for at most two values of h.
For generic parameter values, there does not exist a solution
Proposition 1 tells us that we can have at most two wages, but not if and when we have two. The following proposition shows when we cannot have more than one wage. In particular, single-wage equilibria exhibit a "continuity property," that is, they are the unique equilibria not only at λ i = 1 for i ∈ {1, ..., K}, but also in a strictly positive neighborhood of
Proposition 2 For any K and for any i ∈ {1, ..., K}, there exists some ε > 0 such that w * = w i is the unique single-wage equilibrium if λ i > 1 − ε, with lim ε→0 w i = c i .
Proof. We start with the case λ i = 1. It is easy to see that the unique equilibrium entails θ i = 1 and w * = w i = c i + rU, with profits given by
and where
We want to show that θ i = 1 is also the unique equilibrium in a neighborhood of λ i = 1. Although more than two λs may be positive, the Law of Two Wages implies that at most two wages are posted, and so we can restrict attention to checking pairwise deviations. Thus, let λ k = ε k for all k 6 = i and λ i = 1 − ε where ε = P k6 =i ε k . Then profits from posting w i are given by
Denote by Π j the profits from posting candidate wage w j to which a firm may consider deviating, given by
For θ i = 1 to be an equilibrium we must have Π i ≥ Π j . In the case c j < c i this is equivalent to Ã
Note that i / ∈ Ω j . In the limit of λ i → 1, or equivalently ε → 0, the RHS of (5) goes to zero while the LHS is strictly positive for all values of U, thus verifying that θ i = 1 is an equilibrium for small ε > 0. Now consider c j > c i . The inequality Π i ≥ Π j has the same expression as above, but note that now i ∈ Ω j . Thus,
and so the RHS in (5) goes to 1 while the LHS, by virtue of the assumption c j > c i , is strictly larger than 1 for all U, again verifying the conjecture. Given the "continuity property," expression (3) implies that lim ε→0 w i = c i + r lim ε→0 U = c i .
In GSW we studied the case K = 2. We showed there always exists a unique equilibrium, which may or may not entail wage dispersion. If y is small, all firms post w 1 = c 1 ; if y is big all firms post w 2 ∈ (c 2 , y); and if y is intermediate, a fraction post w 1 ∈ (c 1 , w 2 ) while the rest post w 2 ∈ (c 2 , y). For other values of K, although we know there can be no more than two wages posted, we do not know when there are two, as opposed to one (except, of course, when λ i is close to 1, as demonstrated in Proposition 2). And when there are two, we also do not know which of the two reservation wages they will be. We study these issues in the following example. 
The Example Consider K = 3. As the only wages posted are in {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 }, we write W ij = W i (w j ) for the value of employment at reservation wage w j when a worker draws c i . Then (1) and (2) reduce to
Here we use the result that a worker who draws w = w j and c = c j gets no surplus from the match (in equilibrium he still accepts). Using w j = c j + rU,
where η = α/(r + δ). Also, (4) reduces to Π j = γ r+δ P j i=1 λ i (y − w j ). By Proposition 1, at least one θ j = 0, so there are exactly 6 possible equilibria as listed in Table 1 . We now give conditions determining when each equilibrium exists. We give these conditions in two ways: as restrictions on y, which are relatively simple and facilitate comparison with earlier work (e.g. the results reported in the last paragraph of Section 2); and as restrictions on λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 ), which provide a nice graphical representation of the equilibrium set. To begin, it will be useful to define the following:
Equilibrium 1: θ 1 = 1. This case implies rU = 0 by (6); hence w j = c j and equilibrium profit is
Given all firms post w = w 1 = c 1 , no firm wants to deviate and post w 2 iff Π 2 ≤ Π 1 and no firm wants to post w 3 iff Π 3 ≤ Π 1 , where
Algebra implies Π 2 ≤ Π 1 iff y ≤ y 3 and Π 3 ≤ Π 1 iff y ≤ y 2 . The corresponding conditions in λ-space are given by
This gives necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium 1. Equilibrium 2: θ 2 = 1. Given θ 2 = 1, rU = ηλ 1 (c 2 − c 1 ) by (6), and hence w j = c j + rU = c j + ηλ 1 (c 2 − c 1 ). Using this,
No firm wants to deviate and post w 1 iff Π 1 ≤ Π 2 , which holds iff y ≥ y 3 , and no firm will deviate and post w 3 iff Π 3 ≤ Π 2 , which holds iff y ≤ y 1 . In λ-space, these conditions on y can be expressed as
.
The properties of the -functions are given below, but we need some properties of 3 now to conclude the following: although y 3 ≤ y ≤ y 1 is also satisfied if the above three inequalities are all reversed, this case can be ignored because λ 1 >λ 1 implies 3 (λ 1 ) < 0. Thus, (8) gives necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium 2.
Lemma 1 3 (λ 1 ) goes through the origin, is strictly increasing, strictly convex and positive if λ 1 <λ 1 , and strictly concave and negative if λ 1 >λ 1 , with a discontinuity at λ 1 =λ 1 .
Proof. 3 (0) = 0 is obvious. The first derivative is 3 which is positive if λ 1 <λ 1 and negative otherwise.
Equilibrium 3: θ 3 = 1. Given θ 3 = 1 we can solve for rU , w j , and Π j , and check that no firm will deviate iff y ≥ y 1 and y ≥ y 2 . The first condition y ≥ y 1 can be written as a quadratic in λ 2 for a given λ 1 , say Q(λ 2 ) = Aλ 2 2 + Bλ 2 + C ≥ 0, where
It is easy to see that Q(λ 2 ) is convex and Q(λ 2 ) < 0 at λ 2 = 1 − λ 1 . Hence, Q(λ 2 ) has two real roots that depend on λ 1 , say − (λ 1 ) and + (λ 1 ), one on each side of 1 − λ 1 . Since only λ 2 ≤ 1 − λ 1 is relevant, we conclude that Q(λ 2 ) ≥ 0 iff
The second condition y ≥ y 2 is equivalent to
Hence, equilibrium 3 exists iff
The description above exhausts the single-wage equilibria. By inspection of the y-cutoffs, these cases are mutually exclusive, so there cannot be multiple single-wage equilibria. We now consider two-wage equilibria.
Equilibrium 4: θ 1 , θ 2 > θ 3 = 0. This equilibrium requires Π 2 = Π 1 , an equality that can be solved for
Topics in Macroeconomics , Vol. 6 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 11 Notice θ 2 ∈ (0, 1) iff y ∈ ³ y 3 , y 3´, which is equivalent to λ 2 > 1 (λ 1 ) and
No firm wants to deviate and post w 3 , rather than either w 1 or w 2 , iff
Hence, equilibrium 4 exists iff
Equilibrium 5: θ 1 , θ 3 > θ 2 = 0. This requires Π 3 = Π 1 , which can be solved for
Hence θ 3 ∈ (0, 1) iff y ∈ ³ y 2 , y 2´, which is equivalent to λ 1 <λ 1 and λ 2 > 4 (λ 1 ). No firm wants to deviate and post w 2 iff λ 2 ≤ 5 (λ 1 ). Hence equilibrium 5 exists iff λ 1 <λ 1 , λ 2 > 4 (λ 1 ), and λ 2 ≤ 5 (λ 1 ).
(11)
Equilibrium 6: θ 2 , θ 3 > θ 1 = 0. This requires Π 3 = Π 2 , which can be solved for
where
Observe that the denominator in this expression is the quadratic Q (λ 2 ) defined in the discussion of equilibrium 3. Hence, we can write θ 2 ∈ (0, 1) iff y ∈ ³ y 1 , y 1´, which is equivalent to λ 1 <λ 1 , λ 2 > − (λ 1 ), and λ 2 < 2 (λ 1 ). Actually, the condition θ 2 < 1 is also satisfied if λ 1 >λ 1 and λ 2 > 2 (λ 1 ), but the following lemma shows that this can never be satisfied in the relevant region.
Lemma 2 2 (0) = y−c 3 y−c 2 ∈ (0, 1); 2 (λ 1 ) → −∞ as λ 1 →λ 1 from below; 2 (λ 1 ) → ∞ as λ 1 →λ 1 from above; 2 (λ 1 ) > 1 − λ 1 iff λ 1 >λ 1 ; 2 (λ 1 ) → 1 − λ 1 from above as λ 1 → ∞; 2 (λ 1 ) → 1 − λ 1 from below as λ 1 → −∞;
Proof. The first parts involve straightforward analysis. Proving 2 (λ 1 ) → 1 − λ 1 is equivalent to proving 2 (λ 1 )/ (1 − λ 1 ) → 1, which follows from l'Hôpital's rule. For the last part, observe that ∂θ 2 /∂λ 1 > 0; hence, as we increase λ 1 for any given λ 2 , we hit the threshold at which θ 2 = 0 before we hit the threshold at which θ 2 = 1. This means the 2 (λ 1 ) curve lies above the
Finally, no firm wants to deviate and post w 1 iff λ 2 ≥ 5 (λ 1 ). Hence equilibrium 6 exists iff
This completes our analysis of every case in Table 1 . For each candidate equilibrium 1-6 we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for existence in terms of y and also λ. We can summarize the results as follows:
Proposition 3 Generically equilibrium exists and is unique. If λ 2 < 5 (λ 1 ) then: equilibrium 1 exists iff y ≤ y 2 ; equilibrium 5 exists iff y ∈ (y 2 , y 2 ); and equilibrium 3 exists iff y ≥ y 2 . If λ 2 > 5 (λ 1 ) then: equilibrium 1 exists iff y ≤ y 3 ; equilibrium 4 exists iff y ∈ (y 3 , y 3 ); equilibrium 2 exists iff y ∈ (y 3 , y 1 ); equilibrium 6 exists iff y ∈ (y 1 , y 1 ); and equilibrium 3 exists iff y ≥ y 1 .
Proof. There are two generic cases, λ 2 < 5 (λ 1 ) and λ 2 > 5 (λ 1 ). In the former case it is clear that for all y there is a unique equilibrium. The same is true in the latter case once one recognizes that y 3 < y 1 in the case where λ 2 > 5 (λ 1 ).
In order to present the results graphically, we move to λ-space, and make use of conditions (7)-(12). To do so, we first describe some more properties of the -functions used in these conditions. Proofs are omitted where obvious.
Lemma 3
− (0) ∈ (0, 1). There is a unique λ 0 1 ∈ (0, 1) such that
Proof. For the first part, note that λ 1 = 0 implies Q(0) > 0 and Q(1) < 0, and since Q(λ 2 ) has two real roots − (0) and + (0), one on each side of 1−λ 1 , we conclude − (0) ∈ (0, 1). The second part is shown by noting that λ 1 = 1 implies Q(0) < 0, which in turn implies − (1) < 0. Convexity of Q then implies the existence of a unique λ Proof. Note first that 3 (λ 1 ) > 1 (λ 1 ) for all λ 1 > 0, and 3 (λ 1 ) , 1 (λ 1 ) < 5 (λ 1 ) for small λ 1 , which follows from noting that 3 (0) = 1 (0) = 0 and
, equilibria 2 and 3 coexist, and we would contradict the uniqueness part of Proposition 2; and if − (λ 1 ) > 2 (λ 1 ) for all λ 1 such that − (λ 1 ) > 5 (λ 1 ), we would contradict the existence part. Consequently, − (λ 1 ) intersects 5 (λ 1 ) at a smaller λ 1 than does 2 (λ 1 ).
Figure 1: Equilibrium Regions
Lemma 11
Proof. It must be true that
, otherwise we violate the existence or uniqueness part of Proposition 3.
Given these properties we can draw the -functions, as shown in Figure  1 for two sets of parameter values. It is now a simple matter to fill in the different regions generated by the -functions with the equilibrium that exists in each case. In terms of economics, the results are quite intuitive. Consider, for example, the case of λ 1 close to 1. Then we get a single-wage equilibrium, all firms post the lowest reservation wage w 1 , which maximizes Table 2 : Wages Equilibrium Wages w j for j = 1, 2, 3
1.
profit per worker, and does not reduce the hiring probability too much as λ 1 is big. As λ 2 becomes big we get equilibrium where all firms post w 2 , and as λ 3 becomes big we get wage equilibrium where all firms post w 3 , because firms are willing to sacrifice profit per worker to keep the hiring probability from falling too much. When we are in a region between those with a single-wage equilibrium, we get wage dispersion; for example, between the regions where all firms post w 1 and where all firms post w 2 , some firms post w 1 and others w 2 . The figure illustrates two key points. First, two-wage equilibria are not especially rare. Second, when two-wage equilibria exist, they may entail any combination of w 1 , w 2 and w 3 . Of course, these wages are themselves endogenous -they depend on the equilibrium as well as parameters. Table 2 lists wages in each equilibrium, including those that are not posted; note that in each case, consistent with (3), we have w j = c j + rU.
In Figures 2 and 3 we plot the average wage w, profit Π, unemployment u, and the fraction of firms posting each wage, as functions of productivity y, leaving explicit calculations as an exercise. 6 The figures represent equilibria in the two cases described in Proposition 3: Figure 2 for λ 2 < 5 (λ 1 ) and Figure 3 for λ 2 > 5 (λ 1 ). The figures illustrate the intuitive result that 6 The only variable we have not defined is unemployment which evolves according tȯ higher productivity must benefit either firms or workers in terms of wages or profit, but interestingly, never at the same time: Π is constant in single-wage equilibria and w is constant in two-wage equilibria. Also, u is constant in single-wage equilibria and decreasing in y in two-wage equilibria. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed in detail the model of wage posting with ex post heterogeneity presented in GSW in the case K = 3. We found there always exists a unique equilibrium, and it may or may not exhibit wage dispersion, depending on parameters. Also, any pair of reservation wages may be posted.
We think these results are interesting because this is one of the few models that can generate robust equilibria with wage dispersion, and we therefore want to know more about its properties and the set of equilibria it generates. Several features of the model were known from our previous analysis only for the simplest case K = 2, which is quite special. In particular, one may want to know if two-wage equilibria must have two consecutive wages, the two lowest possible wages, the highest and the lowest possible wage, etc. We showed here that all cases are possible.
We also gave conditions to guarantee that a single wage will be posted. We also showed that equilibrium is unique, which one might not have expected in a search model with posting. Our view is that this class of models potentially has a variety of interesting applications and extensions, and therefore it is good to know as much as possible about its properties. One way of learning about the properties of models is to explore examples in detail, as we did here.
